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FOREWORD
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) considers that
this Letort Paper provides a useful assessment of the
continuities and changes in the foreign policy posture
of Russia’s front-line states following Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014. As a British scholar on Russia,
Keir Giles explains that Moscow already voiced its
opposition when the Baltic States accessed the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, and the
color revolutions presented a democratization model
on Russia’s doorstep. However, at that time, Russia did
not possess the confidence or the capability to counter
what it perceived as Western expansionism by using
direct military action.
The Russia-Georgia armed conflict in August 2008
demonstrated that this was no longer the case. Discussions on the long-term prospect for NATO membership
as it had been offered to Georgia and Ukraine at the
Bucharest Summit a few months earlier were halted.
Nonetheless, 2014 marked a new political watershed:
Russia’s traditional allies are now also concerned with
Moscow’s intentions, just as Western-leaning states in
Central Europe and the Baltic have always been.
This Letort Paper provides a valuable contribution
by focusing on how former Soviet states have adapted
their foreign policy toward Russia since 2014 rather
than the other way round. Significantly, Mr. Giles
encourages the reader to avoid treating these countries as regional blocs, and instead to treat them as
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individual states, each with a specific combination of
risks and benefits arising from their relationship with
Russia. The policy recommendations for the United
States included at the end of each country’s profile
reflect this awareness.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This Letort Paper examines in what ways Russia’s
front-line states have changed or, alternatively, maintained their foreign policy posture in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern
Ukraine in 2014. In general, they have either made
concessions or strengthened defenses against Russia’s new capabilities demonstrated in Ukraine and
Syria. Laying out the risks and assets that each of these
countries derive from their relationship with Moscow
helps explain what may have justified one calculation
over another. This analysis excludes Ukraine (which is
already suffering the consequences of Russia’s readiness to use military power to counter perceived strategic threats) and the Baltic States (which have already
entered Western-led alliances).
Belarus
President Lukashenka will continue his efforts to
leave sufficient freedom of maneuver for his country by striking an uneasy balance between reducing
dependence on Russia and building ties with the West.
The risk of a Russian reaction, which it is his priority to
avoid at all costs, will remain constant.
Moldova
Despite signing a European Union (EU) Association
Agreement (AA), Moldova’s economy still remains
highly dependent on Russia. This gives Moscow the
opportunity to exercise economic pressure and interfere in local elections. Given that pro-European reforms
are stalled, it is expected that pro-Russian parties will
replace the current pro-EU governmental coalition in
xiii

the next parliamentary elections this month. No viable
settlement for the conflict in Transnistria seems to
loom large.
Central Asia
There is a fundamental paradox in Central Asian
foreign policy. On the one hand, since 2014 to 2015,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan have sought to distance themselves
from Russia and to establish closer ties with the West
and China. On the other, the West’s relative inaction during the Ukraine crisis signaled that EuroAtlantic alliances are unlikely to assist in security
crises in Central Asia, but also that Western security
interests in the region are weak. In particular, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (i.e., the richest
hydrocarbon-exporting Central Asian countries) will
remain wary of Moscow’s intentions while maintaining
good relations for regime support and shared values.
Being more dependent on Russia, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan (the poorest countries in the region) share
the view that a U.S. presence is necessary to balance
Russia and China, yet they recognize that it is in their
best interests to stay aligned with Moscow. In general,
the region’s authoritarian leaders fear popular revolts
and seek to safeguard the political status quo, which is
why they do not welcome the sort of change promoted
by Western value-based agendas. Nevertheless, the
damage to the Russian economy caused by falling oil
prices, together with Western sanctions and countersanctions, have reduced the appeal of closer economic
involvement with Russia. Ultimately, China’s projects
will dwarf Russia’s existing economic ties to the region.
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Armenia
The country’s foreign policy is first and foremost
defined by the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. Russia’s
actions in Ukraine served as a confirmation that the
capital of Armenia, Yerevan’s, decision to withdraw
from the AA with the EU in September 2013 to join
the Eurasian Economic Union was wise. Dependent on
Russia for its security and most of its energy supplies,
Armenia is not in a position to resist Moscow, and the
signing of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU in November 2017 should be viewed with this caveat in mind.
At the same time, there is a growing realization that
acquiescing to Russian demands has not won Yerevan
any preferential treatment from Moscow. For example, Russia has continued to supply weapons to both
sides in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. This has led to
re-engagement with other partners.
Azerbaijan
The Ukraine crisis has opened a new dilemma for
the country’s foreign policy. On the one hand, the government in Baku fears regime change by popular protest, but on the other, Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine are a violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, which echoes
Azerbaijan’s stance in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.
Overall, Azerbaijan has never shown interest in integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures. Nonetheless,
while Azerbaijan does not want to provoke Russia, it
has no intention of joining any Russia-led integration
projects. Turkey will remain Azerbaijan’s closest ally
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in its neighborhood, but a good working relationship
has been established with countries such as Israel.
Georgia
Russia’s support for separatist elements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ajaria was a challenge for Georgia long before the 2008 war, but Georgia’s experience
with the direct Russian military intervention in 2008
served as a precursor to that of Ukraine 6 years later.
Since then, in general, Georgia’s pro-Western geopolitical orientation and its overt opposition to Russia have
remained unwavering. A preferential trade AA was
signed with the EU in 2014, and Georgia was granted
visa-free travel to Schengen Area member states in
March 2017. Yet, the Georgian Dream party, which
succeeded Saakashvili’s rule, chose to be less confrontational than its predecessor, which had presided over
the loss of 20 percent of Georgian territory in 2008.
The policy recommendations provided in this
Letort Paper aim to assist the U.S. Government in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, in maximizing
prospects for a new alignment of former Soviet states
and minimizing the risk of a repetition of Russian
actions in Ukraine elsewhere.
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WHAT NEXT FOR RUSSIA’S
FRONT-LINE STATES?
INTRODUCTION
Russian armed intervention in Ukraine in 2014
prompted a radical reassessment by the United States
and its allies of their relationship with Moscow.
However, it also caused other states around Russia’s
periphery to give serious consideration to how they
could avoid suffering the same fate as Ukraine. This
Letort Paper presents a tour d’horizon of Russia’s
neighborhood, assessing whether and how states of
the former Soviet Union have adjusted their foreign
policy posture in light of Russia’s latest demonstration
that it is willing to use military force to resolve perceived strategic challenges.
Russia’s neighbors have never lost sight of the basic
fact governing their relations with Moscow: Russia
sees its near abroad as its domain, and considers that
the West has no business in parts of the world where
Russia has traditionally held sway. When the Baltic
States joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in 2004, Russian opposition was just as strenuous and vociferous as later when it appeared that
Georgia and Ukraine had a real, if distant, prospect
of doing the same. The difference was that Russia in
2004 was a different country than today, one that was
much less capable of taking direct action to oppose the
West and defending its perceived security interests. In
order for U.S. policymakers to understand this perception, it can be helpful to consider NATO accession by
Russia’s neighbors as the equivalent of Canada joining
the Warsaw Pact in 1985.
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Given the more recent perception in Moscow of the
European Union (EU) as a threat alongside NATO—
just in different ways—the prospect of the European
Union (EU) Association Agreement (AA) for Ukraine
in 2014 constituted just as much a loss of territory to
the West as NATO accession would have been. Russia’s forceful reaction stemmed from an apparent conviction that if the West takes all the countries along
Russia’s borders, it will then proceed to Moscow.
This conviction derives from Russian mirroring when
assessing Western intentions. Moscow thinks that the
West would follow a policy of aggressive expansionism, because that is what Russia would do if presented
with the same opportunity.
In 2014, unlike in 2004, Russia possessed both the
confidence and the capability to strike back against
this perceived Western expansionism. In successfully
ending any conversation about NATO membership
for Georgia, the armed conflict there in 2008 demonstrated that counterstrikes of this kind could be successful, as well as making a powerful statement of
Russia’s red lines. Six years later, the situation in
Ukraine was seen as an even more direct threat to
Russian interests. After President Viktor Yanukovych
failed to toe the Western line, the Moscow narrative
runs, the West incited an armed uprising in order to
force regime change and have its way.
After 2014, it has not just been Western-leaning
states in Central Europe and the Baltic that have been
alarmed at Russian intentions—they always have
been—but Russia’s traditional allies have also been
concerned. Ukraine was in some respects supposed
to be a dependable partner of Russia, so other partners—in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and especially Belarus—are now evaluating their relationships.
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Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine sent a message
to three distinct groups of nations. To the West: do not
mess with us or in our backyard. To the near abroad:
do not stray too far, because this may happen to you
too. To any other country in any kind of proximity to
Russian borders: you could be next.
The result is the likelihood that the nations in
between have modified their behavior to avert Russian
retribution. This modification could potentially have
taken the form of seeking accommodation with Russia
by making concessions, or alternatively strengthening
defenses against the new capabilities demonstrated by
Russia in Ukraine and now Syria. In both cases, the
question at the front of the mind of each state within
Russia’s self-declared sphere of privileged interest
must now be: what is the tipping point that would
cause Russia to deploy these capabilities again?
This Letort Paper reviews these changes in behavior or foreign policy stance by the states of the former
Soviet Union. The assessment begins with Belarus, in
light of its current status as the most likely next target
for Russian intervention. It then proceeds to consider Moldova and the states of Central Asia and the
South Caucasus. It does not include those neighbors
of Russia that are members either of NATO, the EU, or
both since these states have already made their strategic choice, and their alignment with the West is clear.
It also does not include Ukraine itself, since Ukraine is
already suffering the consequences of Russia perceiving that it was making a similar choice. Each country
or regional section concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the United States, including specifically the U.S. Army, to minimize the risk of and
maximize the opportunities for the new alignment of
each of these states.
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BELARUS
Of all Russia’s non-NATO neighbors, Belarus presents the most likely candidate to be subjected to the
same treatment as Ukraine. Just like Ukraine, Belarus’s future lies in the balance between the West and
the East; and just like Ukraine, if Minsk chooses the
West, this will be seen as an immediate and severe
security challenge to Russia, which would then necessitate intervention. There is no doubt that the prospect of losing Belarus to the West would be perceived
as immediately threatening to Russia, as was the
case with Ukraine. There are significant differences
between the two countries, but they fill the same role
in Russian perceptions as part of the Slavic heartland
and well inside Moscow’s desired defensive perimeter.
After a considerable period of simmering where
only interested Moscow- and Minsk-watchers were
aware that Belarus constitutes a potential flashpoint in
Eastern Europe, since 2017, the country’s difficulties in
its relationship with Russia have come very much to
the fore. President Alexandr Lukashenka’s increasing
difficulty in managing his balancing act and maintaining his country as an independent state rather than a
province of Russia could well lead to a tipping point
where Russia feels it needs to take decisive action to
safeguard its interests.1
Lukashenka has built on his consistent position
that Belarus is a neutral power by setting up Minsk
as the site for negotiations on the Ukraine crisis and
demonstrating political distance from Moscow on
controversial issues—most notably Russia’s conflicts
with Georgia, Ukraine, and Turkey. Small initial steps
in the direction of political liberalization at home have
combined with this ostensible neutrality in foreign
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policy to make Belarus a more acceptable prospect for
the EU and the United States. Emerging from international isolation is crucial for Belarus’s long-term development and for mitigating reliance on the sinking
Russian economy. Outreach from Minsk and shows
of liberalization, such as the release of political prisoners, have been addressed with sanctions relief by the
EU—which has been criticized because of concerns
that persist over Belarus’s human rights record. While
waiting for responses from the EU, Belarus has also
been encouraging Chinese investment and defense
procurement cooperation. Lukashenka is forced by
circumstance to constantly seek new opportunities
for freedom of movement. His embrace after 2014 of
Belarusian national culture, which he had previously
spurned, bolsters his image as the defender of an independent Belarusian state, and one prepared to emphasize the country’s differences from Russia.2
However, since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Belarus’s delicate position
has been repeatedly threatened, as Moscow has persistently tried to assert control at the same time as
Minsk seeks to diminish its dependence on Russia and
seek friends elsewhere.3 With relations between the
two countries deteriorating, Russia has taken a number
of unfriendly steps. These include rebuilding border
controls with Belarus (foreigners from a number of
countries are now banned from crossing the border by
road).4 In doing so, Russia demonstrates that it cares
little for Belarus’s notional status as a co-member of
the so-called “Union State” of Russia and Belarus,
as well as of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), of
which both countries are founding members.5
Belarus looks at both Russia’s and NATO’s military preparations with alarm. Unlike Russia, whose
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claims of being “encircled” by NATO are based on
fantasy, for Belarus, this is already a fact. The landlocked country is already surrounded by military
buildup and conflict on all sides; this includes substantial U.S. Army forward presence in Poland from
early 2017. Acutely conscious of the history of the area
now known as Belarus, which constituted the traditional battleground for larger powers from the East
and the West with devastating consequences for the
region itself, the primary concern of Belarusian officials is to avoid any repetition of this scenario in a conflict between Russia and NATO.6
Outreach
Belarus has persistently sought opportunities to
establish or maintain relations with Western states and
organizations. The level of outreach has varied from
semi-clandestine, cross-border contacts with immediate neighbors at times of increased Russian pressure
to a broad campaign of rapprochement during more
relaxed periods. A new development since 2014 has
been a heightened sense of urgency in establishing
relationships to counterbalance Russian influence and
the risk of Russian assertive action.
Defense relations with the United States and
other NATO nations appear to be moving ahead rapidly. During a surprise 3-day visit in March 2016,
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael
Carpenter met senior Belarusian defense officials
and President Lukashenka.7 Offering an exchange of
defense attachés, Carpenter reportedly said that the
main focus of U.S. policy toward Belarus was now
“steadfast support for its sovereignty and territorial
integrity.” Defense attachés from the United States and
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the United Kingdom (UK) were subsequently accredited after a long absence, and a framework agreement
on defense cooperation with the UK is planned for signature to match one already signed with the United
States. This too risks triggering a firm Russian reaction.
But both the EU and NATO are constrained in how
far they can respond to Belarusian overtures. The EU
tends to view Belarus through the prism of human
rights violations, limiting the scope for cooperation
in other areas.8 Meanwhile, in NATO, Turkey continues to block work with “partner nations” including
Belarus—conveniently for Russia.
Bilateral relations can also be complicated, in
particular with immediate neighbors. The status of
minorities is a continuing irritant in relations with
Poland. Cross-border talks with Lithuania, which had
been developing well, were derailed by controversy
over Belarus developing a nuclear power plant on the
Lithuanian border only 50 kilometers from the capital,
Vilnius. This deterioration accelerated in March 2017,
when President Lukashenka alleged that “armed militants” who trained in camps in Poland, Lithuania,
and Ukraine, and with funds supplied by Warsaw and
Vilnius, were attempting to destabilize the internal situation in Belarus.9 Belarusian analysts say this implausible scenario is an indication of how Lukashenka may
be influenced by disinformation from his security services, which are among the most Russia-friendly elements of the Belarusian administration.10
Lukashenka also faces the problem of Belarus
fatigue in the West. Decades of tacking between
Russia-friendly and EU-friendly policy statements
and repeated promises of liberalization followed by
renewed suppression of dissent and accommodation
with Moscow have left Western officials suspicious
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of any new attempt at rapprochement. At the same
time, Belarus’s delicate balance means that fears of
imminent Russian hostile action also surface regularly.11 Repeated false alarms of likely Russian intervention also dull Western sensitivities to the very
real danger that Russia could take assertive action,
despite Lukashenka’s past success in avoiding pushing Moscow too far.
The most recent false alarm came in late March
2017. March 25 is the anniversary of a short-lived independent Belarusian state in 1918, and it is traditionally a day for rallies organized by opposition groups.
This year, it also followed a series of smaller protests
about a controversial new law penalizing so-called
“social parasites” who do not work a certain number
of days each year. Demonstrations were permitted in
a number of provincial towns, but not in the capital;
however, mass rallies went ahead regardless.
There were two additional factors that may have
made these street protests particularly alarming for
Belarus. First, Russian state media had been steadily
promoting the narrative of a possible color revolution
or regime change through popular unrest in Belarus,
stoked by U.S. interference and funding.12 Second, at
that time, portions of Russia’s 98th Airborne Assault
Division were already arriving in eastern Belarus for a
separate joint exercise.
The response by the authorities was firm, but not
dramatic by local standards. Just over 700 people
were arrested, with most released the same day without charges or still awaiting trial. The following day,
more arrests were made at rallies in support of those
detained the day before. Some demonstrators—and
apparently a number of bystanders who were in the
wrong place at the wrong time—were given heavy
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fines or short prison sentences. Nevertheless, this
response may have been enough to deprive Russia of
any immediate excuses for interfering by demonstrating that Lukashenka and his security forces had the
situation well in hand.
Defense Cooperation with Russia
In the event of crisis with Russia, the position of
Belarus’s armed forces would be critical. Assessments
by Western analysts of where the loyalties of the Belarusian military lie vary widely. It has been suggested
that the divisions in the Belarusian authorities as a
whole, for example between the West-leaning Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the solidly Russia-friendly
security services, are replicated within the armed
forces. According to this argument, the perception of
the two countries’ armed forces as closely integrated
is misleading, despite the fact that a so-called “Union
State” of Russia and Belarus has been in existence for
20 years. Even though the great majority of Belarusian
officers are Russian speaking and many of them have
been trained and educated in Russia, there is sufficient
consciousness of national identity and resentment at
heavy-handed treatment by Russia that substantial
resistance to Russian initiatives could be expected.
On the other hand, the consistent official view from
Poland and Lithuania in particular is that the Belarusian armed forces should be seen as simply an
extension of their Russian counterparts. In this view,
integration is complete, and no independent thought
or action, let alone resistance to Russian military
movements, should be expected.13
Belarus does visibly resist Russian attempts to
control the provision of its military security. When

9

Belarus needed to purchase modern fighter aircraft
to upgrade its aging air force, Moscow announced
instead that Belarus would be hosting a Russian airbase to provide for joint defense. Lukashenka faced
down pressure from Russia and successfully insisted
on the aircraft purchase instead. Standing firm in this
way challenged Russia’s perception of the country as
an extension of its own territory. However, the standoff over air basing was just part of a consistent pattern of Russia announcing “joint” defense initiatives
which were not endorsed by Minsk. In 2016, Russia
announced the creation of a “joint military organization of the Union State,” including notional unification
of the two countries’ armed forces. This statement too
was made unilaterally by Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Shoygu, with no comment from Belarus. As
with other manifestations of the “Union State,” this
appears to be a Russian idea that could remain largely
on paper without Belarusian cooperation.
Other examples include Russia repeatedly stating
that it intends to deploy missile systems on Belarusian
territory. These statements come as a more or less routine response to a wide range of U.S. and NATO initiatives that Russia disapproves of, most recently the
basing of ballistic missile defense capabilities in Redzikowo, Poland.14 Yet again, despite Russia commonly
presenting this move as a joint initiative, it is firmly
resisted by Belarus.15
The existence of a joint air defense system with
Belarus may present a more serious complicating
factor in the event of confrontation, depending on the
extent to which it is implemented.16 The location of
Russian air defense systems and how much their operations are integrated with Belarusian systems could
significantly influence the freedom of movement
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of U.S. and NATO air assets across a wide range of
Alliance territory. If Belarus should decide or be persuaded tohost advanced Russian air defense systems,
their range into NATO airspace would be greatly
extended by adding a substantial forward basing
area in addition to Kaliningrad. But even before that,
if Russia were to exercise what it sees as its right to
defend Belarusian airspace with or without moving
ground-based air defenses forward, Russia’s own air
defense zone would be pushed forward by hundreds
of kilometers, adding to the Kaliningrad effect by further deepening the isolation of the Baltic States from
the NATO “mainland.”
Russia continues to aspire to take over portions
of Belarus’s capability for self-defense. A key argument against acquiescing to this security outsourcing
is Belarus’s wish not to involve itself in confrontation. Hosting Russian airbases, air defense systems, or
more ground troops would undermine Belarus’s aspirations for neutrality by presenting both a potential
source of hostile activity against Western neighbors
and a target for countermeasures.
However, there are now indications that the possibility of a Russian military operation against Belarus
is being taken seriously. While major Russian military units are being relocated closer to the Belarusian
border, Belarus has notably started to make military
preparations that appear more relevant for conflict
with Russia.17 Lukashenka noted in 2015 that the Belarusian Army needed to be capable of “being thrown
from Brest to Vitebsk in half a night,” in other words,
from the Polish border to the other end of the country
opposite Russia.18
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Outlook
Hosting a reported 160,000 people displaced by
the conflict in Ukraine, Belarus is already suffering the consequences of Russian intervention there.
Lukashenka’s primary focus must be avoiding similar
action against Belarus. Because of simple geography,
falling out of favor with Russia will always have far
more serious consequences for Belarus than disappointing the West. Meanwhile, Russia will be watching with concern Belarus’s improving relations with
the West for any sign that this means loosening ties
with Russia. Bilateral talks between Lukashenka and
Putin shortly after the March 2017 demonstrations,
although ostensibly resolving a gas dispute, gave the
impression of a normalization in relations.19 However,
this may be only temporary.
Further steps toward the normalization of relations
between the United States, the EU, NATO countries,
and Belarus will need to be handled with caution if
they are not to provoke a dangerous reaction from
Russia. Russia will seek means of deterring what it
sees as U.S. encroachment, but judging the point at
which it will act will be challenging. In Ukraine, it took
the departure from power of President Viktor Yanukovych to trigger the Russian response. However, it
is possible that, emboldened by success in Ukraine
and Syria, Russia might feel capable of intervening at
an earlier and less dramatic stage than in the case of
Belarus.
Much has been written in media commentary
about the so-called “Suwałki gap,” the narrow strip
along the Polish-Lithuanian border that separates
Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave from Belarus. However,
many of the scenarios of Russian military adventurism
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in this area assume a compliant Belarus and a Belarusian military functioning as merely an extension of
the Russian armed forces. The real situation is greatly
more nuanced than this—Belarus may not wish to go
to war with Russia, but equally it is showing no inclination to go to war for Russia.
As with a number of other scenarios, the power
of action in this region lies in its potential for destabilizing NATO and for demonstrating Alliance helplessness. It is claimed in Russia that if Poland in 1939
had acquiesced to German demands for a land corridor to Danzig, World War II could have been avoided.
No matter how remote this may be from the truth, it
should be seen as a potential rationale and justification
for if Russia would demand—or establish by subterfuge or “humanitarian convoys”— a land corridor to
Kaliningrad. This would only happen if Russia were
confident that it could predict or manage the NATO
response, or the lack thereof.
A Russian intervention along the lines of Ukraine
is considered plausible if Russia considers it necessary
to ensure Belarusian obedience, including by removing Lukashenka and replacing him with another figure
more acceptable to Moscow. However, Russia would
have little interest in destabilizing Belarus, with consequent expensive unrest on the Russian border, if more
subtle ways of reining in the country’s independence
could be found. In fact, the current president may be
the least worst option for Russia. After decades of persecution by the Belarusian authorities, the political
opposition in Belarus is small and marginalized—but
it is entirely pro-Western, and there is no recognized
figure within the country who would make a credible
pro-Russian replacement for Lukashenka.
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Nevertheless, according to a Finnish study,
“[T]he time may be ripe . . . to start thinking about
the previously unthinkable, be it economic collapse in
Belarus, radical internal transformations or an externally-triggered crisis.”20
Policy Recommendations
President Lukashenka’s position is not easy. Maintaining a degree of freedom of movement for his country by attempting to reduce dependence on Russia
and build ties with the West runs the constant risk of a
damaging Russian reaction. Any tightening of domestic control may buy more time by heading off Russian
accusations of dangerous instability, but the likely cost
is a setback in Belarus’s outreach efforts to the EU and
its neighbors. In any case, Belarus will still sooner or
later be faced with a decisive choice between the East
or the West; and the United States, the EU, and NATO
need to be fully prepared for that moment.
In this context, the following are specific policy
recommendations for the United States:
• The United States should respond positively
to outreach initiatives from Belarus, especially invitations to observe exercises. It should
encourage NATO allies to do the same.
• Direct bilateral ties should continue to be developed to the maximum extent possible while
remaining sensitive to damaging Russian backlash. This should include not only diplomatic
representation, but also direct defense cooperation and military-to-military engagement. Both
formal and informal measures are important.
• For the U.S. Army, this engagement should
include initiatives on a local, cross-border level
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to establish direct contact between U.S. units
that are forward deployed in Poland (and
potentially Lithuania in the future) and their
Belarusian counterparts. Any opportunities for
establishing confidence-building measures or
direct lines of communication should be taken.
• Contact with Belarus should include, as a priority, discussions of crisis management options
in the event of a more serious confrontation
between Russia and Belarus, the United States,
or a neighboring country of Belarus, or among
all three.
• Intelligence and analysis efforts should be
devoted to tracking and understanding the likely
reactions of the Belarusian military and security
structures to a confrontation with Russia, both
on a national and local level.
MOLDOVA
Moldova’s process of developing relations with
the EU—and the consequent worsening of relations
with Russia—has been ongoing since 2009. Russian
action against Ukraine did not cause any evident shift
in Moldova’s overall foreign policy direction, but it
did accelerate these processes already under way.
As part of the response to events in Ukraine in early
2014, Western partners became increasingly interested
in stepping up the pace of the European integration of
Moldova. The pro-European government coalition in
Moldova capitalized on this increased interest, hoping
to ensure that the Ukraine crisis did not spill over
to its eastern neighbor. By April 2014, Moldova was
granted a visa-free regime with the EU, and in June,
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it signed the EU-Moldova Association Agreement
that also included a Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreement. At the same time, the government
in Chisinau hosted more high-level EU and U.S. delegation visits in 2014 than in any previous year. These
visits resulted in significant financial assistance to
Moldova for the promotion of economic reforms and
enhancement of border security.
Moldova also became more involved in defense
cooperation with NATO and directly with the United
States, leading to the granting of non-NATO ally
status in December 2014.21 Concurrently, in March
2014, Moldova’s Anti-Mafia National Movement, with
broad domestic support, declared that the country
should follow Ukraine’s example and withdraw from
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as
well as introduce a visa regime for Russian nationals.22
An online poll conducted from March to April 2014
showed that 66 percent of citizens supported leaving
the CIS.23 The country also joined EU sanctions against
Ukrainian and Russian officials in March 2014.24 This
increased cooperation with Western partners has led
to an inevitable worsening in relations with Russia.
Mixed Support for Ukraine
The Moldovan Government reiterated its continuing support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity throughout 2014.25 Declared support for overall regional
stability also led to a broad, renewed interest in finding
a viable solution for the Transnistrian conflict, despite
Russia using the separatist region as an additional
means of destabilizing Ukraine. This robust Moldovan narrative on Ukraine only changed in November
2016 with the election of pro-Russian Igor Dodon as
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President, who then publicly discounted Ukrainian
territorial integrity by declaring that Crimea belongs
to Russia.26 Dodon’s statement eventually led to a diplomatic freeze between Chisinau and Kiev.
Dodon has already visited the Kremlin several
times during his presidency in an apparent search
for legitimacy through appearances next to Vladimir Putin. At the same time, his original anti-EU
stance is gradually changing toward a more pragmatic approach, after being elected by a constituency
to which he has promised integration in the Russia-backed EEU instead. In an extensive interview with
the Russian news agency Interfax in November 2016,
he explained that he sought a “strategic partnership”
with Moscow, taking into account Moldova’s strong
economic dependence on Russia. At the same time, he
stressed that he would not abolish the EU-Moldova
Association Agreement, since Moldova needs good
relations with both the East and the West.27
Domestic Challenges
As a result of the previous pro-European orientation, Moldovan relations with Russia gradually deteriorated throughout 2014. The Russian authorities
imposed new bans on products originating from Moldova, restricting Moldovan exports to Russian markets for critical branches of the Moldovan economy. In
April 2014, Russia added an embargo on meat products originating in Moldova to a September 2013 ban
on Moldovan wines, and later bans on fruit and vegetables.28 Concurrently, Russia selectively lifted the ban
on wine imports from Gagauzian and Transnistrian
producers.29 By giving preferential treatment to these
regions, Russia antagonized the Moldovan population
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still further. Moreover, it openly defied the Moldovan Government by interfering in the domestic affairs
of these regions, explicitly supporting candidates in
Transnistrian and Gagauzian local elections. This
combination of economic pressure and interference in
local elections is thought to have induced the Moldovan authorities to temper their public condemnation
of further Russian aggression in Ukraine.
November 2014 Elections
While the Ukraine crisis was unfolding, Moldova
prepared for the parliamentary elections to be held
in November 2014. Already existing social divisions
were exploited by political parties taking advantage of
the new regional instability. The Socialists capitalized
on Ukrainian events by warning of a potential “Moldova-Maidan scenario,” replicating events in Kiev
after the elections. By contrast, the Liberal Party, also
referring to events in Ukraine, pleaded for Moldova
to abandon its neutral status and accept NATO troops
on its territory, arguing “the security and freedoms of
Moldovan citizens can be ensured only by NATO.”30
According to one public opinion poll in November
2013, less than 10 percent of citizens named “war in
the region” as one of the three problems that worried them the most; by November 2014, this number
exceeded 30 percent. The election results reconfirmed
Moldova’s European orientation, with a pro-EU coalition winning with a much-reduced mandate.
Escalations in the Transnistrian Conflict
Early events in Ukraine had a significant impact on
subsequent developments in the separatist region of
Transnistria. On March 18, 2014, only a few days after
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the Crimea referendum, the Transnistrian authorities
sent an official request to Sergei Naryshkin, Chairman
of the Russian State Duma, asking for consideration
of annexation of Transnistria to the Russian Federation.31 This request was later repeated multiple times.
The Moldovan authorities have declined to take the
Transnistrian gesture seriously, claiming it is “purely
symbolic and without practical value.” Prime Minister Iurie Leancă declared that this was not the first
time Tiraspol had undertaken actions of this kind, and
therefore, it was not a reason for serious concern.32
In contrast, the gesture caused alarm in Ukraine,
NATO, and the EU, sparking renewed interest in
resolving the conflict. Ukraine imposed an economic
blockade in Transnistria by obstructing the transportation of goods for the Russian military.33 It also
interdicted the transit to and from Transnistria of
Tiraspol officials and Russian peacekeeping troops via
Ukrainian territory, an action that has not been replicated by Moldovan authorities.34 In 2015, Ukraine
took further actions, such as blocking the import of
excisable products across the Transnistrian border,
following the territory’s declared wish to join Russia.35
This blockade has affected 70 percent of Transnistrian
enterprises.
Moldova does not appear to have capitalized on
the window of opportunity created by Western partners in the first half of 2014 to find a viable settlement
for the 2-decade-old, frozen conflict in Transnistria.
Meanwhile, the authorities in Tiraspol have continued
to take bolder steps with Russian support. In April
2014, they boycotted the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) negotiations under the
“5+2” format to be held in Vienna, Austria.36 In January 2017, partly as a result of the inactivity of the
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Moldovan authorities, Tiraspol opened a permanent
representation in Moscow, an action subsequently
declared illegal by Moldova.37 Partly as a result,
Moldova and Ukraine have stated their intention to
deepen bilateral cooperation.38
Public Opinion
Understandably, considering the proximity of the
events in Ukraine, Moldovans have watched developments in 2014 closely. Despite the strong effects of
Russian media propaganda, especially felt prior to the
November 2016 elections, Moldovan attitudes toward
the Russian intervention in Ukraine appear split
according to preexisting views about the geopolitical orientation of the country.39 One-third of citizens
would like to join the EU, another third would like to
see Moldova a member of the EEU, and the rest do not
express an opinion. Unsurprisingly, citizens who view
Moldova as having a European future have predominantly condemned Russian intervention in Ukraine
and expressed support for Ukrainian territorial integrity. Moreover, the Moldovan diaspora abroad has
also taken Ukraine’s side and condemned Russian
aggression, including by way of a public declaration
by 80 diaspora associations across 27 countries. These
views have also urged the international community to
assist Moldova in preventing potential spillover of the
conflict onto its territory.40 In Transnistria, by contrast,
there is no clear understanding of the views of citizens
toward the war in Ukraine, since no polls have been
made public.
Despite these evidently strongly held views, there
have been very few public demonstrations against
the Russian Government in Chisinau. One of the
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few events organized was an early student protest in
April 2014 with slogans such as “Here is not Crimea,”
“Putin—aggressor,” and “Russian Army get out!”41 By
contrast, the pro-Russian segment of society, primarily the elderly and Russian speakers, have taken a passive approach toward unfolding events and appear to
avoid being publicly outspoken about their views.
Outlook and Policy Recommendations
In November 2018, Moldova will hold parliamentary elections where it is expected that pro-Russian
parties will gain significant electoral support to form
a new government. As pro-European reforms are
currently stalled with consequences felt by society at
large, the current pro-EU governmental coalition is
expected to lose its parliamentary majority.
Considering the mounting societal support for
pro-Russian political forces, the following policy
options would assist the United States in containing
Russian influence and facilitating the preservation of
Moldova’s European orientation:
• Offering support to new pro-European parties
emerging on the political scene, within overall
democracy promotion programs;
• Continuing civil aid and outreach programs
aimed at the Moldovan population;
• Facilitating imports to the United States of
products banned from Russia but vital for the
Moldovan economy;
• Stepping up support for the settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict; and,
• For the U.S. Army specifically, fostering and
continuing direct military-to-military contacts with the Moldovan armed forces and
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encouraging this within the context of ongoing
training missions within western Ukraine.
CENTRAL ASIA
For all of Central Asia’s growing importance, it is a hard
area to grasp analytically. To nonspecialists, it is likely to
be something of a terra incognita, an unknown region,
whose landmarks impart a sense of unfamiliarity, even
unease, to those coming from the outside to try and
understand it. Yet, at the same time, even for specialists,
its reality is elusive and debates abound as to the nature
of its domestic politics in both individual states and
across the region.42

Since emerging from independence in the early
1990s, the Central Asian countries’ geopolitical relations with external powers have fluctuated considerably. Bilateral relations with Russia and the United
States have waxed and waned, but Central Asia is
now firmly situated in the economic, political, and
security orbit of Russia and China, with diminishing
ties to Euro-Atlantic structures.
Owing to Central Asia’s interdependency with
Russia and the latter’s consistent desire to increase its
leverage in the region, Russia is likely to remain the
most influential external actor over the security landscape. The wealthier hydrocarbon-exporting Central
Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, will lean toward Russia for regime support
and shared values, but they will remain wary of too
much proximity with their unpredictable northern
neighbor.43 Moscow may continue to play on the vulnerability of the poorer states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, providing military assistance to entrench its
relevance for the region. Meanwhile, Central Asia’s
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key economic partner, China, is unlikely in the short
term to challenge Russia’s military dominance in the
region, although this dynamic could change if the
security of China’s commercial interests in the region
is challenged.44
Mixed Feelings on Russia
Russia’s ambitions for its position in Central Asia
since independence have been much grander than
its ability to impose its influence. Russia’s perceived
role as the security guarantor for the region, particularly with regard to the overspill of insecurity from
Afghanistan following the withdrawal of NATO in
2014, has been tested and found insufficient.45 Russia’s refusal to assist during an outbreak of violence
between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan
in 2010 illustrated how Russia was not able to project power and intervene during internal conflict. The
annexation of Crimea and attacks on eastern Ukraine
from 2014 onwards merely continued a process of erosion of Central Asian states’ trust in Moscow.
However, regional Central Asian foreign policy
shows a paradoxical trend. On the one hand, the five
countries seek distance from Russia, particularly since
2014 to 2015, looking for closer ties with the West or
China. Yet, on the other hand, they remain aware that
the West’s relative inaction during the Ukraine crisis
demonstrated that Euro-Atlantic security alliances
are unlikely to assist in security crises in Central Asia,
and furthermore that Western security interests in the
region have substantially diminished.
Domestic factors are also key. Central Asia is facing
a wide range of difficulties, including severe budgetary pressures, stalling economic growth, deteriorating
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socio-economic conditions, and rising public disaffection. Rule of law is absent, and corruption is widespread. The prospects for internal and interregional
conflicts are higher at the time of this writing than
they have been for a quarter of a century. The region’s
authoritarian leaders fear popular revolts and seek to
safeguard the political status quo. By contrast, the values-based agenda promoted by the West represents a
risky and unwelcome change for regional strongmen
who rely on informal networks rather than institutions. In spite of diminishing trust in Moscow, Russia’s illiberal approach is regarded by Central Asian
leaders as the most attractive governance model to
weather the current storm. Putin’s re-election in the
2018 Russian presidential elections will only have
reinforced this impression.
Central Asia after Ukraine
The Ukraine crisis provoked conflicting reactions
from the Central Asian governments. Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan initially refrained from
supporting Russia’s position, partially in order to
maintain positive relations with the West, but later
aligned their positions closer to Russia’s. Tajikistan’s
reaction to the crisis was muted; neither the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs nor high-level officials spoke publicly
about Ukraine or stated the country’s position.46 Traditionally more neutral, Turkmenistan also did not take
a stand on the Ukraine crisis, and Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs only released a statement concerning Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
In the majority of the countries besides Kyrgyzstan,
the largely state-controlled media soft-pedaled events
in Ukraine, giving more airtime to Russia’s view on
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events, shown through the largely Russia-dominated
popular media in the region.
Nevertheless, the alarming precedent of a more
aggressive and volatile Russian foreign policy in the
region, and in particular Russia’s assertion of a right
to defend Russian minorities abroad, provoked particular concern in Kazakhstan—home to the second
largest ethnic Russian population outside Russia after
Ukraine (23 percent of Kazakhstan’s population) and
shares an 8,000-kilometer border with Russia.
“Maidan Contagion”
More importantly however, the ousting of President Yanukovych raised concern that similar
“Maidan” revolutions could occur in Central Asia. The
Georgian (2003) and Ukrainian (2004) “color” revolutions had already unnerved the Central Asian governments, but the overthrow of Yanukovych cemented
the regional governments’ anxiety regarding their sustainability of power. One result was a further tightening of the civic space in the region to mitigate the risk
of Maidan contagion, particularly in Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan. In 2015, both of these countries introduced
new legislation analogous to that adopted in Russia
in 2012 that forced foreign-funded nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) to register as foreign agents.47
These steps move the governments further away
from values-based Western agendas and potential
alignment with Western governments under traditionally acceptable relationships. In the Western view,
they also risk undermining security further in the long
run.48
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General Trends and Projections
Russia—Forging Military Dependencies to Secure
Geopolitical Loyalty
Russia is the principal supplier of military equipment to Central Asia, and Kremlin rhetoric suggests
an increased emphasis on a military approach toward
security in Central Asia. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm,
Sweden, Russia has significantly increased its export
of major weapons to Kazakhstan (a recipient of 0.7
percent of the world’s major weapons) and supplies
76 percent of Kazakhstan’s total arms imports.49
Russia also conducts military exercises with Central Asia, both bilaterally and increasingly through the
Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Institutions such as the CSTO and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), effectively
led by China, are seen as being ineffective in formal
terms, but playing an influential role in supporting
nondemocratic governments in the region through
legal agreements, such as multilateral counterterrorism mechanisms.50 In October 2015, in response to
the perceived but often exaggerated security threat
from Afghanistan, Russia signed various agreements
on combating international terrorism and announced
base extension agreements with Tajikistan until
2042 and with Kyrgyzstan until 2032.51 Russia also
increased the number of military drills and joint exercises with Central Asian forces.
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Russia—Weak Economic Player in Central Asia
Since 2014, Moscow has sought to use economic
cooperation to strengthen ties between Central Asian
states and Russia, pushing all countries to demonstrate loyalty by joining the EEU, especially following
Ukraine’s departure from the organization. Nevertheless, the damage to the Russian economy caused
by falling oil prices, together with Western sanctions
and countersanctions, have reduced the appeal of
closer economic involvement with Russia.52 Furthermore, initial assessments of the EEU suggest that its
domination by Russia is reflected in a counterintuitive
decrease in regional trade.53 Tajikistan has expressed
tepid interest in joining the EEU owing to uncertainty
about its impact on the domestic economy, but also
because it is concerned about damaging economic and
diplomatic relationships with non-EEU actors, such
as Qatar and Iran. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are
unlikely to join the union.
Although Russia enjoys some debt leverage over
the weaker Central Asian countries, China’s One Belt,
One Road multi-million dollar project in Central Asia
will ultimately dwarf Russia’s existing economic ties
to the region.
U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia
The United States assisted Central Asia’s geopolitical orientation to the West in the 1990s, helping the
countries attain and defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.54 This included
supporting the creation of democratic governance,
free-market economies, and regional economic integration. After the terrorist attacks in the United States
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on September 11, 2001, Central Asia moved to a position of high priority in U.S. strategy due to the region’s
ability to support large-scale U.S. military operations
in Afghanistan. During these years, the United States
appeared to be gaining a longer-term foothold in the
region, while Russia’s position was weakening. Meanwhile, Moscow holds a mixed view on the role of the
United States in the region. It resents U.S. military collaboration with the regional governments, but at the
same time, it is concerned that the region is vulnerable
to attacks from extremist Islamic groups.
Under President Barack Obama’s administration, which oversaw the withdrawal of NATO from
Afghanistan, the United States paid less attention to
Central Asia as the U.S. foreign policy focus moved
to other regions, in particular the Middle East and
Asia. Fading U.S. attention unnerved Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, countries which are keen to see Western
involvement in the region to hedge against the competing interests of Central Asia’s key economic, political, and security partners, Russia and China.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have attempted to
maintain U.S. focus on Central Asia through various diplomatic initiatives, the latest being the “five
plus one dialogue” (five Central Asian states plus the
United States). Former U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry’s visit to the region in November 2015 gave
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan optimism for the return
of the United States to the region, but this was shortlived. Countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
which are more dependent on Russia, share the view
that a U.S. presence is necessary in Central Asia to balance Russia and China, but they also recognize that
their best interests lie in keeping aligned with Russia.
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The election of U.S. President Donald Trump has
reinforced concerns among Central Asian governments that the region will remain on the periphery of
U.S. foreign policy. Besides the phasing out of International Security Assistance Force combat operations
in Afghanistan, the United States lacks “compelling
interests” in Central Asia, in contrast to those in China,
Iran, and Russia.55 Furthermore, the United States does
not share values with Central Asia or envisage new
economic investment incentives in the region owing to
low oil prices and challenging regional business environments. Although the United States has stepped
up its training of elite military units in the region,
overall, U.S. military aid programs in Central Asia
have decreased.56 However, the regional governments
will push for the United States to continue to provide
military assistance as well as economic aid through
multilateral international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund.
It has been suggested that President Trump’s
narrow focus on “Islamic terrorism” could align with
Central Asian governments’ exploitation of the global
fight against terrorism for domestic purposes to override previous U.S. concerns over human rights and
corruption, which had undermined counterterrorism
and security cooperation with Central Asia.57 In addition to counterterrorism, Central Asian governments
are likely to accept U.S. assistance in improving border
security and enhancing their counternarcotic and possibly counter human-trafficking capabilities.
Tajikistan
After the Ukraine crisis, Tajikistan was the most
reluctant Central Asian country to take a position,
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staying largely silent. This muted reaction can be
explained by the fact that Tajikistan is the poorest of
all former Soviet states and is beholden to Russia for
both economic and security support. Tajikistan’s relations with the West have always been superficial. After
joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1999, Tajik
cooperation with NATO failed to evolve, and NATO
closed its office in Dushanbe in 2016. Recent U.S. polls
suggest that 34 percent of the Tajik population regard
NATO as a threat.58
Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has put Tajikistan
under a lot of pressure to join the EEU, but President
Emomali Rahmon has resisted, owing partly to considerable controversy domestically, attempting to seek
legal protections for Tajik migrant laborers in Russia,
and greater admission quotas for Tajik students
in Russian universities. In 2014, remittances from
migrant laborers were worth more than half of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).59
Tajikistan relies on Moscow for its security. Russia’s
largest military contingent abroad is the 201st Military
Base in Dushanbe, with 7,000 troops who are expected
to remain in the country until 2042.60 An agreement
was signed in February 2017 during a visit by Putin
to Tajikistan to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border
with the help of the 201st Russian Military Base. In the
future, Tajikistan is likely to strengthen partner relations and strategic cooperation with Russia, as it meets
the country’s vital interests: Moscow and Dushanbe
have an impressive array of shared legal and regulatory bodies that govern their interactions in almost all
spheres of activity.61
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Kyrgyzstan
In contrast to other Central Asian countries, in early
March 2014, Kyrgyzstan initially recognized the legitimacy of the Ukrainian transitional government and
questioned the legitimacy of President Yanukovych.62
Once the Russia-Ukraine tensions escalated, Bishkek
quickly retreated from this position and refrained
from commenting. The government never criticized
Russia and ultimately recognized the Crimean referendum to join Russia.
During the first decade of the 21st century, Kyrgyzstan was the object of competition of three integration projects: America’s New Silk Road, China’s Silk
Road Economic Belt, and the EEU. However, while
the West has largely abandoned its ambitions, China
and Russia continue to deepen their ties. As one of the
weaker Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan is vulnerable to Russian leverage, including considerable pressure to join the EEU. During President Putin’s visit
to Kyrgyzstan in February 2017, he highlighted the
success of Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the union, noting
that remittances from Kyrgyz laborers grew by about
18.5 percent over 9 months in 2016 to US$1.3 billion
(approximately one-third of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP).63
Russia maintains military installations in Kyrgyzstan, including the Kant Air Base near Bishkek and
a naval test site at Lake Issyk Kul in the Tien Shan
Mountains. In 2014, further Russian pressure and
financial incentives caused the Kyrgyz parliament to
vote for the closure of the U.S. airbase at Manas Airport in Bishkek, a key U.S. facility in Central Asia since
2011 that hosted approximately 1,500 soldiers and had
been used as a staging post for flying personnel and
equipment in and out of Afghanistan.
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Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia has been
attempting, with limited success, to leverage soft
power in Kyrgyzstan through mass media and education.64 Russian television is very influential in Kyrgyzstan, as it is throughout Central Asia, and has assisted
in spreading Russia’s views on the West and also on
the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Uzbekistan
Former President Islam Karimov, who ruled from
the end of the Soviet period until his demise in September 2016, sought to reduce Russia’s political and
economic dominance over his country and the region
in line with the broad principles of Uzbek foreign
policy. On a number of occasions, he warned against
renewed “great power chauvinism” and denounced
military cooperation within the Moscow-led alliances
of the CIS and CSTO.
Following Russia’s incursions into Ukraine, the
Uzbek Foreign Ministry issued a statement declaring that Russia’s deployments in Crimea ”cannot but
cause deep anxiety and concern in Uzbekistan.” Karimov was a vocal critic of Russia’s aggressive comeback
in Central Asia, expressing concern over Moscow’s
political and military leverage over Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. Trying to diversify its alliances, Uzbekistan
has developed its partnership with China and other
regional powers, such as South Korea, Japan, and the
Gulf States.65
Uzbekistan’s new foreign policy trajectory under
the mandate of Uzbekistan’s new President Shavkat
Mirzioyev has yet to take definitive form. Uzbekistan
is unlikely to enter alliances that would undermine
its military-political sovereignty, including hosting

32

foreign military bases, participation in military blocs,
and joint action between Uzbek and foreign troops
outside of Uzbekistan.66 Nevertheless, Russia remains
Uzbekistan’s second most important trading partner
(China surpassed Russia in 2015) and enjoys some
leverage over Uzbekistan owing to the high number
of Uzbek migrant workers in Russia. As a place of
employment for approximately four million Uzbek
migrant workers and, as a result, the Uzbek Government is particularly sensitive over how the return of
these immigrants could be a catalyst for unrest.
Uzbekistan has broadly welcomed China’s increasing economic presence in Central Asia as a balance to
Russian interests. China’s interests in the region align
closely with those of the Uzbek elite, emphasizing the
importance of maintaining a stable security environment, not interfering in the internal affairs of other
states, and combating the “three evils” of separatism,
terrorism, and extremism.
In the 1990s, Uzbekistan joined NATO’s PfP and
supported the Alliance’s expansion to include the
Baltic States. Despite criticism of the regime’s human
rights record, the country became the main U.S. ally in
the region. However, Uzbekistan’s relations with the
West collapsed following Tashkent’s violent suppression of demonstrators in Andijan in May 2005. The
West’s critical response and the imposition of an arms
embargo led to a volte-face in Uzbekistan’s diplomatic
relations. Uzbekistan accused the United States and
Kyrgyzstan of providing financing to the demonstrators, demanded U.S. forces quit the Karshi-Khanabad
base, and closed a number of U.S. NGOs based in the
country. Over a decade later, the Uzbek elite is now
anxious to maintain positive relations with the West to
secure international legitimacy for the new president
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and as a potential source of much-needed investment
and security assistance.
Kazakhstan
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan
has tried to act as bridge between Europe and Asia,
maintaining ties with Moscow but also subscribing to
a multi-vector foreign policy strategy. Russia is wary
of Astana’s links and debts to China, whose advance
into Kazakhstan threatens to tip the balance of power
in Central Asia. Kazakhstan is a member of both
NATO’s PfP program and the Russian-led CSTO, and
its membership in the EEU should be viewed within
this complex matrix. President Nazarbayev’s positive
relations with Moscow and the West are an expression
of his country’s identity as a crossroads between continents and cultures.
Astana has positioned itself as a mediator for the
Iran and P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany) negotiations regarding the nuclear issue; for Russia-Turkey
talks; and, more recently, for several rounds of peace
talks for the Syria conflict. Although the Syrian peace
talks in Astana have not been successful, hosting highprofile events aids Kazakhstan’s international image
and lends it gravitas in its standing in relation to Russia.67 Russia is also grateful to Kazakhstan for its “geopolitical loyalty” in supporting Russian efforts at the
United Nations (UN) (Kazakhstan became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council on January 1, 2017).
Although Russia sees Kazakhstan as a natural part
of a Russia-led Eurasian economic and security system,
events in Ukraine altered how Kazakhstan views
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Russian intentions in the former Soviet space. At the
onset of the Ukraine crisis, Kazakhstan expressed concerns about Ukraine’s territorial integrity and voiced
veiled criticism of Russia’s use of force in Ukraine.
However, this view was soon replaced by an official
“understanding” of Russia’s position (with Kazakhstan recognizing the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum, before back-pedaling again). The articulation
of Kazakhstan’s independent foreign policy identity
has become more pronounced since the annexation of
Crimea due to fears that Russia could use a Ukraineor Georgia-style pretext to intervene militarily in order
to “protect” ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan.
The removal of Yanukovych was also the first time a
regime change in the former Soviet Union involved
the participation of an organized right-wing nationalist opposition. This raised concerns in Kazakhstan
about threats to the regime from their own growing
nationalistic movement.68
The likelihood of Russia taking expansionist steps
in northern Kazakhstan and provoking ethnic unrest
is low, particularly given the impact that it may have
on Chinese interests in the region. However, there is
persistent unease in Kazakhstan owing to uncertainty
regarding Russia’s regional intentions. Putin stoked
such concerns in October 2014 when he remarked that
the Kazakh state did not exist prior to the fall of the
Soviet Union in 1991.69 In response to Russia’s assertiveness, Kazakhstan has been closely monitoring
societal developments and introducing subtle policy
changes to balance interethnic relations on its northern border.
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Turkmenistan
In character with the country’s position of neutrality, Turkmenistan remained silent on Russia’s
annexation of Crimea. However, in keeping with
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy being a function of
the country’s gas exports, in October 2015, President
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov expressed formal
support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
independence of Ukraine (a key export destination for
Turkmen gas) during a meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.70
Turkmenistan is anxious with regard to Russia’s
expansionist policies and aware that China, its main
gas client, cannot serve as an effective counterweight.
Turkmenistan was also hit by Russia’s unexpected
and unilateral decrease in its gas imports in 2009.
Consequently, Ashgabat will continue to attempt
to increase its cooperation with the West in order to
diversify its customers and routes. In spite of shared
U.S.-Turkmenistan enthusiasm for the Turkmenistan
to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) pipeline,
the feasibility of the project is still in doubt, owing to
security and financial issues.
Security along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan
border is of increasing concern to the Turkmen leadership and is forcing Turkmenistan to examine its
position of neutrality.71 Turkmenistan has reportedly allowed Russian and Uzbek military personnel
to assist in strengthening the border.72 In 2015, Turkmenistan approached the United States for military
aid to assist the country in addressing instability on
its border with Afghanistan.73 Security concerns on the
southern border are likely to persist, and in the context of continuing economic difficulties, the Turkmen
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Government will continue to seek military assistance
from the United States, and possibly Russia as well.
Policy Recommendations—Central Asia
Specific policy on the states of Central Asia must
necessarily be determined by the overall U.S. strategic aims for the region. At the time of this writing,
these aims appear to be in flux and not formulated
in a manner which is accessible and comprehensible
for outside observers (and consequently, it has to be
assumed, for the states of the region as well).
But whatever eventual policy priorities are set,
continued close monitoring of the relative strength of
foreign influence from Russia and China in the region,
and gauging their appetite for risk in security and economic terms respectively, is essential. One of the most
effective ways of continuing this monitoring will be
preservation of a strong corps of defense attachés to
augment U.S. diplomatic representation in the region.
Cuts or restrictions to diplomatic presence or defense
engagement would be highly damaging to situational
awareness.
If Russia wishes to legitimize assertive action in
Central Asia, one method of doing so would be to use
the CSTO. For this reason and others, the United States
should continue to handle the CSTO with caution.
The CSTO up to this point has had mostly symbolic value as a notional counterweight to NATO
and a body initiated by Moscow to counter potential
NATO and U.S. influence in the former Soviet space.
However, the period since 2014 has seen a renewed
impetus on the CSTO to grow into a full-fledged
military-political alliance capable of performing its
declared responsibilities and tasks.74 In this context, it
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must be remembered that the CSTO’s political will and
military capacity remain essentially Russia’s.75 Consequently, the uses to which it will be put will serve
Russian objectives, if necessary, against the interests of
other members. This is analogous to the Warsaw Pact,
which was unusual among military alliances in that it
only ever invaded itself.
Furthermore, it is still the case that engagement
with the CSTO, whether through NATO or directly,
should be avoided because it would provide the organization with the validation and legitimation it seeks.
CAUCASUS
In the Caucasus, fallout from the Ukrainian conflict will
almost certainly strengthen the most uncooperative
and belligerent dimensions of Russian policy. Hopes to
promote a more cooperative relationship between Russia
and NATO as a foundation for benign enlargement have
been shattered. . . . The Caucasus remains a shatterbelt,
where Russian interests are defined in such a way as to
make them incompatible with the vision of the region’s
fixture that is dominant in the West. The Ukrainian conflict
seems to be exaggerating the degree of incompatibility.76

Not all foreign policy developments in the South
Caucasus should be ascribed to the effects of Ukraine.
Many trends there are long-term and do not reflect
contradictions between the West and Russia. Most
prominent among these, of course, is the suspended
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Russia is content to exploit disputes such as this
as pressure points in order to work toward short- or
long-term objectives, and to maintain a military presence in the region wherever possible.77
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In terms of balance between Russia and the EU,
the South Caucasus states could hypothetically benefit
through participation in both integration projects: the
EU’s AAs and the Russia-led EEU. However, just as
it is in Ukraine, the EU’s agenda in the South Caucasus is also a threat to Russian interests. The crisis in
Ukraine could quite possibly have taken place in the
Caucasus instead.
Russia follows a tri-polar policy in the South Caucasus, making significant distinctions in its approach
to each of the regional actors, including Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Nagomo Karabakh. Its political, economic, and military leverage is strong and
influences fundamental decisions of its partners and
non-partners in the region. By contrast, it is now
broadly recognized that European and North American partners, insofar as they cannot act as promptly or
directly in the region as can Russia, are consequently
less powerful and reliable actors in the Caucasus.
Armenia
Armenia’s foreign policy is first and foremost
defined by the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.78 Depending on Russia for its security and most of its energy
supplies, Yerevan is not in a position to resist Moscow’s drive to keep the EU out of the South Caucasus. For Armenia, Russia’s actions in Ukraine served
as a confirmation that Yerevan’s decision to withdraw
from the AA with the EU in September 2013 to join
the EEU was the right course of action. In the months
following the Crimea annexation, Yerevan carefully
stuck to a pro-Moscow line. In March 2014, Armenia was 1 of only 11 countries that voted against UN
General Assembly Resolution 68-262, which affirmed
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the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Some analysts
argue that despite the different context, this decision
stemmed from Armenia’s support for Karabakh’s
right to self-determination.79
Membership in the EEU has failed to bring promised economic benefits to Armenia. In fact, the volume
of its bilateral trade with Russia fell by 11 percent in
2015 but, despite some growth in 2016, has still not
recovered to 2014 levels.80 In addition, remittances
from Russia dropped sharply for three consecutive
years as a consequence of Russia’s economic slump
due to the fall in the price of oil.81 As remittances constitute between 15 and 20 percent of Armenia’s GDP
every year, this has had an impact on a large section of
the population.
However, the outbreak of violence in Karabakh
in April 2016 encouraged the Armenian leadership to
reassess their policy. The fact that Azerbaijan managed
to retake a sliver of territory was considered a major
humiliation for Armenia. The authorities in Yerevan
felt the backlash from over 2 decades of nationalist
and militarist rhetoric targeted at its population; the
military defeat led to public outrage that resulted in
a wave of dismissals from the General Staff.82 There
is a growing realization among the population that
pervasive corruption and lack of reform in the name
of security have weakened the country instead of
strengthening it. It has also become clear to Armenian
policymakers, as well as the general public, that acquiescing to Russian demands has not won Yerevan any
preferential treatment from Moscow. Russia, despite
being one of the Minsk Group co-chairs leading the
mediation of the conflict in Karabakh, has continued
to supply weapons to both sides. The CSTO, of which
Armenia is a member, did not intervene during the
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clashes. What is more, its fellow members refused to
condemn Azerbaijan (a nonmember) for initiating the
violence.
Consequently, there are signs that the Armenian
leadership has realized it needs more room to maneuver in foreign policy. While good relations with Russia
are crucial, Yerevan needs to establish them from
as strong a position as possible. This has led to reengagement with other partners (e.g., with Iran).
Following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) nuclear deal, work on a joint project with
Iran of a hydropower plant on the Arax River can proceed. A deal has been signed on increasing gas imports
from Iran, and there are plans to establish a free economic zone in Meghri.83 The Armenian tourism sector
also attracts an increasing number of Iranian tourists
due to the deteriorating situation in Turkey, encouraged by Yerevan’s decision in August 2016 to scrap
visas for Iranian tourists.84
France is another country with long-standing links
to Armenia, mainly due to its large Armenian diaspora. The French company Veolia won a €800 million
tender for the expansion of Armenia’s water network
in November 2016.85 Like the other two South Caucasus states, Armenia is also trying to attract Chinese
investment. Bilateral trade has increased significantly
since 2011, and an agreement on military cooperation
was signed in 2012. However, at the moment, China’s
involvement in the Caucasus is minuscule compared
to its activities elsewhere, and it is not sufficiently
invested in the region to cause concern to Russia.
The reconnection with the EU after Armenia’s
withdrawal from the AA is also part of this drive. A
new deal with the EU, the so-called Comprehensive
and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), billed
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as a “solid basis for the continuation of social and
economic reforms,” was signed in November 2017.86
From Yerevan’s point of view, the main purpose of the
CEPA is to keep lines of communication open, much
as Armenia’s continuing participation in the PfP program does with NATO.
It is unlikely that this agreement will lead to deep
engagement with Brussels. Such involvement would
risk provoking Moscow, which Yerevan is not willing
to do. Armenia’s inclination toward and dependence
on Russia is long standing and unlikely to change
soon. The Armenian political elite includes many figures with strong Russian connections; this is true for
both the Republican Party and the Prosperous Armenia Party (the two main political parties in Armenia).87
A cabinet reshuffle in September 2016 brought no significant changes; on the contrary, the appointment of
Karen Karapetyan, formerly the head of Gazprom’s
Armenian subsidiary, as prime minister was widely
seen as a nod to Russian interests. Furthermore, the
government in Yerevan is not interested in pursuing
the political reforms necessary for closer engagement
with the EU, as they would go against deep-seated,
vested interests, which are often enmeshed with
Russia.
Even if the Armenian political establishment were
inclined to steer its foreign policy away from Russia,
their ability to do so is limited. Russia has a military
base on the outskirts of Gyumri, Armenia’s second
largest city, housing approximately 3,000 troops. In
addition, Russia owns key state assets in Armenia,
many of them acquired in return for debt cancelation
in the early 2000s. Gazprom operates the country’s gas
distribution network, including the Iranian-Armenian
gas pipeline, and would be well placed to obstruct
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implementation of any decision by Yerevan to import
most of its gas from Iran. Russia is responsible for 80
percent of Armenia’s gas supplies and can increase tariffs at will, as it did in 2013. Russia is also the sole supplier of fuel to Metsamor, an Armenian nuclear power
plant responsible for 30 percent of the country’s electricity generation. A Russia-based Armenian entrepreneur owns the electricity distribution network, and
Armenia’s railway network is owned by Russian Railways.88 But most importantly, from Yerevan’s point
of view, Russia is Armenia’s main weapons supplier,
with a generous credit line allowing Yerevan to purchase armaments it could not otherwise afford.
Armenia’s leadership is likely to try to continue
its current policy for as long as possible. Popular discontent has manifested itself repeatedly since 2014,
although it has not coalesced into a formal political
movement.89 The government has failed to address the
roots of popular discontent, namely corruption and
unemployment, since to do so would mean to fatally
undermine the country’s political establishment.
Therefore, the leadership is likely to fall back on its
standard solution of rallying people around the Karabakh issue by keeping the conflict simmering. However, the dynamic in Azerbaijan, on the other side of
the Karabakh line of contact, is similar, and the situation on the ground has become more unstable since
the outbreak of violence in April 2016.90 This could
lead to a renewal of fighting.
If both parties to the Karabakh conflict were able to
achieve a resolution, this would open up a wide range
of new policy avenues for Yerevan and at the same
time greatly decrease Moscow’s influence. However,
the Armenian Government is not yet under sufficient
pressure—either internal or external—to support a
compromise solution.
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Azerbaijan
Similar to Armenia, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy
is guided by two key considerations—regime preservation and the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.91 The
Ukraine crisis has presented Azerbaijan with a diplomatic challenge. On the one hand, the government in
Baku is no fan of regime change by popular protest;
but, on the other hand, Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and military intervention in Donetsk and Luhansk are
a violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a principle close to Azerbaijan’s heart because of the Nagorny
Karabakh conflict.92 This means Baku needs to balance
sustaining its stated position on Karabakh with not
unnecessarily provoking Russia.
Policy-wise, however, the events in Ukraine only
reinforced two lessons from the Georgia-Russia war
of 2008. First, Russia is not averse to using force to
maintain influence over its neighborhood. Second, the
United States and the EU are not willing to intervene
militarily to protect an Eastern Partnership state. In
addition, the Euromaidan protests in Kiev confirmed
Baku’s view that civil society should be kept on a tight
leash. Steadily sliding deeper into authoritarianism for
over 2 decades, the regime intensified its crackdown
on civil society and dropped all pretense of tolerating
external oversight of its political standards.93 This has
attracted international criticism, but only the cases
of high-profile political prisoners, such as prominent
human rights activist Leila Yunus, have mobilized
sufficient pressure for their release. Baku has therefore learned that, as long as it does not cross a certain
threshold of sensitivity, its crackdown on civil society
will have no international consequences.
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These trends have contributed to a pronounced
cooling of relations between Azerbaijan and the
United States and the EU. But Azerbaijan has never
shown interest in integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and meeting the conditions for this integration.
For the government, links with the United States and
and the EU are a pragmatic way of balancing Russia’s
influence. Baku is keen to retain a southern energy
export route to Europe as a way of giving the EU and
United States a stake in Azerbaijan’s independence
and increasing their interest and involvement in the
Karabakh peace process. Given uncertainty over the
former and a perceived deficit of the latter, the Azerbaijani Government sees little incentive to develop
relations beyond energy trade, which appears to be
satisfactory for Brussels and Washington. Energy
links are set to continue unencumbered by political
conditionality, and Azerbaijan’s suspension from the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in March
2017 is unlikely to have any impact on the financing
and execution of the Southern Gas Corridor project.94
Azerbaijan’s policy toward Russia is based on the
calculation that Russia’s main concern in its neighborhood is to keep the EU and NATO out. Since, unlike
Georgia, Azerbaijan has no intention of having close
relations with either, the government in Baku hopes
this will dissuade Moscow from making any effort to
bring Baku more firmly into Russia’s orbit. However,
while Azerbaijan does not want to provoke Russia,
it has no intention of joining any Russia-led integration projects, whether they be the CSTO or the EEU.95
Azerbaijan’s position with regard to Russia is thus
more confident than Armenia’s; in fact, Russia possesses fewer direct levers of influence. After the deal
for renewing the lease for the Gabala radar station fell
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through in 2012, there are no Russian military installations on Azerbaijani soil. In addition, the country’s
energy export network is not controlled by Russia,
and its economic assets are in the hands of local clans.
Nevertheless, Azerbaijan keeps a careful eye on
Russia’s activities. The two are rival energy exporters,
and Russia does possess means of influencing Azerbaijan externally. The most obvious method is Moscow’s role as one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group,
which mediates in the Karabakh conflict. While none
of the parties to the conflict see Russia as an honest
broker, Baku is especially wary of Russia’s longstanding alliance with Armenia. Russia is Azerbaijan’s
main supplier of weapons, while also maintaining
“arms sales parity” between Baku and Yerevan.
Moscow also has other tools to influence Azerbaijan’s domestic politics. The candidacy of Rustam
Ibragimbekov, a dual Russian-Azerbaijani national, in
the 2013 presidential election made the government in
Baku realize that its diaspora can be used as a political tool by Moscow. In addition, Baku allowed Sputnik, the Kremlin’s propaganda channel, to operate in
Azerbaijan starting in May 2015, because not granting permission would have created difficulties with
Moscow. Its coverage has mostly followed the official
Baku line so far, but the channel could prove dangerous in Azerbaijan’s otherwise tightly controlled media
environment.
Azerbaijan’s approach to its other neighbors shows
varying degrees of warmth. The JCPOA nuclear deal
could present new opportunities for economic cooperation and energy linkages with Iran, but low energy
prices make investments in long-term infrastructure
unlikely in the near future. In other spheres, Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran are tense. Iran has close
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connections to Armenia, and Baku is also suspicious
of Tehran’s potential to use religion to influence Azerbaijani politics.96 Due to its fear of politicized religion,
Baku also closely watches events in Syria. The Islamic
States in Iraq and Syria proved a convenient outlet
for religious insurgents, but Baku is increasingly worried about what their eventual return would mean for
regime security.
Relations with Georgia are cordial, but Turkey
remains Azerbaijan’s closest ally in its neighborhood, staunchly supporting Baku’s position on Karabakh. Baku has reinforced this relationship through
investments in Turkey’s energy infrastructure. However, President Erdoğan’s increasing unpredictability
may present Baku with diplomatic challenges in the
future—as happened during Ankara’s rapid falling
out and equally sudden reconciliation with Moscow in
2017.
Further afield, Azerbaijan has established a good
working relationship with Israel. For Baku, the main
advantages to this are the ability to purchase military
equipment, at least slightly decreasing dependence on
Russia.97 In addition, friendly relations with Israel give
the Azerbaijani Government access to the pro-Israeli
lobby network in the United States; this is valuable in
Baku’s eyes as a possible counterbalance to the influence of the Armenian diaspora.
Like the other South Caucasus states, Azerbaijan has made overtures to China. The construction
of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is partly
financed by the China-backed Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, and China’s Sinopec is partnering
with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
(SOCAR) on the construction of a petrochemical plant
in Garadagh.98 However, the links are likely to remain
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minor; China has already secured access to Central
Asian gas resources, compared to which Azerbaijani
reserves are not significant.
Azerbaijan is set to continue this multi-vector
approach to foreign policy. The main risk for the government is the interplay between popular dissatisfaction and the Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan has long
ignored the need for a diversified economy, and consequently the oil price slump has hit the population
hard. Faced with popular discontent, Baku is likely
to fall back on its standard solution of focusing citizens’ attention on the Karabakh conflict. Locked into
an arms race with Armenia and emboldened by its
small gains in the April 2016 clashes, Azerbaijan may
be tempted to try its luck again. However, should it
fail, it may face domestic unrest on a larger scale than
the localized social protests seen so far. Targeted international effort can help prevent any such escalation of
the Karabakh conflict, although resolution in the near
future is unlikely.
Georgia
The August 2008 5-day war between Russia and
Georgia is a clear antecedent of the war Moscow is
currently prosecuting in Ukraine. Georgia, under a
reformist leader with Westward ambition, was left
dismembered and weakened by the conflict. In addition, it was left with greater anti-Russian resolve than
ever.
With first-hand experience, Georgia did not need
the Ukraine crisis to be reminded of the threat posed
by Russia, to strengthen its defenses, to reform with
the aim of acceptance by Europe, or to prepare its population for more confrontation to come.
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Domestic Context
Georgia is ostensibly the most democratic of the
post-Soviet countries with the exception of the Baltic
States. It had its own color revolution in 2003, overturned an incumbent party at the ballot box (Georgian
dream for the United National Movement [UNM]
in 2013), and saw a head of government promise to
step down voluntarily and then actually do it (Prime
Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili in 2014). Through these
changes, two things have remained consistent: Georgia’s pro-Western geopolitical orientation and its
stance in overt opposition to Russia.
The pre-2008 mutual hostility between the two
countries was clearly dangerous for the weaker
power. Georgia had long been dissatisfied with Russia’s support for its separatist elements in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Ajaria. This support initially grew
from rhetoric to economic pressure. Embargoes on
traditionally favored exports to Russia, such as wine
and mineral water (Russians have a taste for the salty
mineral water and semi-sweet wine) hit the Georgian
economy hard in key sectors, and the impact was
enhanced by a fall in the flow of remittances from Russia.99 In 2008, the confrontation between the two countries finally resulted in open warfare.
International Context
The history of relations between the United States
and post-Soviet Georgia is one of consistent misunderstanding. Minded to support a young Western-educated leader in the form of Mikheil Saakashvili from
2003, and encouraged by the initial bout of radical
reform, the George W. Bush administration failed to
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notice that reform had begun to atrophy and Georgia’s
leader was becoming increasingly demagogic. Georgia had been flattered by the attention it was receiving
from the United States, including an unprecedented
American presidential visit. It also seemed to offer
Bush a much needed foreign policy “win.”100 However, U.S. intentions and America’s hitherto unqualified backing were misread by Saakashvili in August
2008, when he appeared to expect more substantial
U.S. support for offensives into South Ossetian territory in an attempt to preempt Russian aggression.
Arguably, an overcorrection followed. If the Bush
administration could have been accused of blind support for Saakashvili and Georgia, the Obama administration could credibly be said to have not paid it and
the wider post-Soviet region sufficient attention at
all—with disastrous consequences in terms of undeterred Russian expansionism and flouting of international agreements.
The War in Ukraine
The annexation of Crimea and outbreak of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine provoked predictable and
reasonable reactions from Georgia. “We told you so”
was the most common, generally followed by, “Why
didn’t we get this much support in 2008?” But beyond
this, Georgian reaction at the popular and elite levels
came out strongly in support of Ukraine. In the early
days of the conflict, Georgia, in keeping with its disproportionately large contributions to peacekeeping
and humanitarian operations elsewhere in the world,
sent political and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while
anti-Russian demonstrations gathered in Freedom
Square singing the Ukrainian national anthem. Some
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Georgians are still reported to be fighting for Kyiv in
the east, in addition to numerous former government
officials now serving in Ukraine—most notoriously,
Mikheil Saakashvili as governor of the Odessa region,
and most recently, former Foreign Minister Eka
Tkeshelashvili as head of a new EU-funded anti-corruption initiative.
In planning for conflict with Ukraine, Russia
copied what worked in Georgia and adjusted what
did not. Distribution of fresh Russian passports
(pasportizatsiya), the supposed casus belli of defending
the rights of compatriots, and accusations of malign
Western intentions were repeated in both conflicts.
The most striking similarity between the two wars,
however, has been their ceasefire plans. In both cases,
Russia has used its own interpretation of internationally brokered agreements to cement an on-the-ground
advantage.
Nevertheless, despite the Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014, which sought to bolster military
support for non-NATO allies, no country or international organization has come forward with a convincing plan to countering Russian military adventurism.
To Georgia, this resembles Western acquiescence in
Russian supremacy in the shared neighborhood.
Georgian Moves
Georgia has made small adjustments to its Russia
policy in the transition from the UNM to the Georgian
Dream party (via an uncomfortable cohabitation).
Saakashvili’s successors, aware that their predecessor
had presided over the loss of 20 percent of Georgian
territory in 2008, were minded to be less confrontational.101 Initial concerns about Prime Minister
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Bidzina Ivanishvili’s past business connections in
Russia appeared unfounded, and Georgia maintained
its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty (and its aspirations for NATO and EU membership). However,
anti-Russian rhetoric has been noticeably softened and
more carefully worded by Georgian Dream leaders—
especially in public.
Nevertheless, Russia’s continuing occupation of
Georgian territory provides constant reminders of the
suspended conflict and a means for leverage or pressure. Examples include Russia persistently expanding the border of occupied South Ossetia, proposing
a Treaty on Alliance and Integration to Abkhazia, or
moving toward the absorption of local forces in the
territories into the Russian Army.
Assessing Russian success in its Georgia policy
depends upon an assessment of what Russia may consider to be success. If the intention is to weaken Georgia, prevent its membership in NATO and the EU,
and discredit it through persistent smear campaigns
against Saakashvili, then Russia has succeeded. If the
intention was to force Georgia back into a Russian
sphere of influence and into nominally multilateral
organizations of its choosing, then Russian policy has
certainly failed. A preferential trade AA was signed
with the EU in 2014 (and came into force in 2016);
and in March 2017, Georgians were granted visa-free
travel to Schengen Area member states. Both Georgia’s
war with Russia in 2008 and Ukraine’s in 2014 have
reaffirmed the country’s pro-Western foreign policy
course and ensured the further marginalization of the
already barely significant pro-Russia constituency.102
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Policy Recommendations—Caucasus
• Armenia specifically: Encourage the Armenian
diaspora in the United States to focus their
financial donations on development projects
and insist on economic and governance reforms
in return for their investment.
• Azerbaijan specifically: Continue to raise concerns over human rights violations and religious
freedom in order to challenge the Azerbaijani
perception that the West is unconcerned over
how it treats its citizens.
• Armenia and Azerbaijan: Together with the
other Minsk Group co-chairs, pressure Armenia and Azerbaijan to de-escalate tensions over
Karabakh. Do not defer all initiative to Russia.
• Work with the international community to
increase the provisions for monitoring the
line of contact in Karabakh to deter ceasefire
violations.
• Support initiatives that bring Armenians and
Azerbaijanis together. These could focus specifically on peace-building but could also be
broader. Involve the younger generation (e.g.,
secondary school students) as well (contact
between the two populations has been prevented since the start of the war and many in
the younger generations have never met anyone
from the other side).
• Support the creation and provision of alternative sources of information on current events
and the history of the Karabakh conflict; this
includes supporting international broadcasters such as RFE/RL and Voice of America to
continue providing services in Armenian and
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Azerbaijani, as they are a valuable source of
information for the local population.
• Offer training and mentoring opportunities.
These should take the form of business/education/journalism professionals spending a designated period of time in the target country,
offering advice relevant to the local conditions.
In particular, support initiatives and projects
that focus on critical thinking skills (at all levels).
• To help fight corruption, enforce anti-money
laundering regulations at home to prevent the
proceeds of corruption in the region from being
reinvested in the United States. Encourage
international partners to do the same.
CAUTION AND CLARITY REQUIRED
The variations outlined earlier in how countries in
the former Soviet space have responded to the Ukraine
crisis underscore the importance of treating them as
individual states, rather than as members of blocs or
regions. Each country has its own individual matrix of
risks and benefits associated with its relationship with
Russia. Consequently, each requires a highly unique
and tailored approach by the West in general, and
the United States in particular, in order to maximize
advantage and minimize risk in negotiating the country’s short-term future.
The current hostilities with Ukraine are unlikely
to be the last example of open confrontation between
Moscow and a former Soviet republic. For as long
as the frontline states aspire to independence, unrestricted sovereignty, and determining their own future
and foreign policy, this will constitute an unresolved
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conflict with Russia’s desires for a sphere of privileged interest that extends beyond its borders. In this
respect, the current state of heightened fragility and
sensitivity of international relations in the region is
likely to continue until conclusively resolved in one
direction or the other. This could take the form of an
individual country’s submission to domination by
Moscow, or alternatively a sufficiently firm rebuff to
Russia’s ambition that the threat recedes for a significant period.
Throughout this time, the United States is faced
with the challenge of pursuing its own interests in
the region without upsetting the current delicate balance. Two examples in the last decade, of Georgia in
2008 and Ukraine in 2014, illustrate how a failure to
take into account the violence with which Russia will
defend its perceived security interests has caused
entirely innocent Western aims to precipitate armed
conflict.
The South Caucasus and Central Asia present the
United States with strategic choices. If it is considered important that the United States maintain influence and reach in these regions, then it is essential
that this be properly resourced with all of the means
of hard and soft power at the disposal of the United
States, including diplomatic, economic, and military
outreach. If, on the other hand, their strategic use has
passed, then it must be recognized that there is little
to oppose Russia’s efforts at extending its influence
through these regions. In either case, the least productive and most dangerous approach would be to make
empty promises, supporting the aspirations of these
states to avoid Russian domination with words and
nothing more.
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Moldova, and especially Belarus, present special
cases. Each country has shown its desire to join the
Western community of nations, and yet, each is subject to effective Russian pressure to avoid doing so.
Belarus in particular presents an opportunity for significant strategic change in Eastern Europe. Peaceful
realignment with the West seems unlikely, at least
without a dangerous and damaging Russian backlash.
However, Belarus’s current status as an ostensibly
neutral buffer between Russia and the West is far preferable to the alternative, a direct extension of Russian
military power along NATO’s eastern borders.
At the time of this writing, each of the countries
under discussion will be waiting for a clearly formulated statement of U.S. policy toward the region. It
is essential that once the policy has been stated, it is
applied consistently and supported unequivocally in
the face of inevitable Russian opposition.
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